10 Jul (NucNet): In 2012 the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) carried out 173 “baseline” security inspections at commercial nuclear power plants and 23 “force-on-force” inspections, which between them identified 153 findings, of which 146 were of very low security significance and seven were greater than very low security significance.
The NRC said in a statement that by comparison, there were 217 security inspections (193 baseline and 24 force-on-force) and 151 findings in 2011, of which 140 were of very low security significance and 11 of greater than very low security significance.
Whenever a finding is identified during a security inspection, the NRC ensures the issue is corrected immediately or “compensatory measures” are put in place. However, details of security findings are considered sensitive and not released to the public.
Baseline security inspections concentrate on access authorisation, access control, physical protection systems, material control and accounting (MC&A), and response to contingency events.
Force-on-force inspections use a mock adversary force to test a facility’s security posture. During force-on-force inspections the adversary force attempts to reach and simulate damage to “significant systems and components”.
The findings were made public in an unclassified version of the NRC’s annual report to Congress detailing the previous year’s security inspection programme. The report is required under the US Energy Policy Act of 2005.
The report covers the NRC’s security inspection programme, including force-on-force exercises, for commercial nuclear power plants and Category I fuel cycle facilities.
It says following force-on-force inspections licensees can be asked to improve or add physical security structures and technologies. If a licensee determines that the adversary team did not encounter the desired delay throughout the simulated attack, it might add extra delay barriers such as fences or locks on doors or gates, the report says.
“In another example, if a licensee decides that earlier detection and assessment are desirable… it might choose to add sensors, cameras, or lighting.”
Finally, licensees might employ additional security personnel as a result of lessons learned from force-on-force exercises, the report says.
NRC chairman Allison Macfarlane said the report describes the NRC’s efforts to ensure the protection of the nation’s nuclear power infrastructure against terrorist attacks.
The report is online:
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/congress-docs/correspondence/2013/boxer-06-28-2013.pdf
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To contact the editor responsible for this story: David Dalton at dalton.david@nucnet.org
